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Sunday, November 22, 2026 · UTC
Tech

BGP hijack exploits routing and TLS flaws to push malware via Softaculous updates

Hackers hijacked BGP routes and TLS issuance to take over Softaculous IPs and distribute malware disguised as updates.

TruthFoundry News Desk
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Stands on 12 placed sources from 3 publishers.
Hackers carried out a supply chain attack that installed malware on networks by hijacking a chunk of Internet space used for updates of cloud management software. [1] The attackers performed a BGP hijacking to obtain control over IP addresses assigned to Softaculous, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. [2] The attackers used the hijacked IP addresses to push malware masquerading as updates to unsuspecting users. [3][7] Softaculous confirmed that a malicious Virtualizor update package was delivered to a small number of installations that checked for updates while their traffic was being diverted by a BGP hijack. [4][5] Virtualizor reported that hackers used a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack to divert Softaculous traffic to an attacker-operated server during the incident window from August 28 at 20:57 UTC to August 30 at 06:10 UTC. [6] Softaculous encourages all Virtualizor operators to check for potential compromises, reset client-area passwords, review account activity, and regenerate API keys. [8] Softaculous notes that their product update clients did not yet cryptographically verify update packages, which allowed a modified package to be installed without rejection. [9] The BGP hijack started at approximately 20:57 UTC on August 28, 2026, when AS62390 (NexonHost) began announcing a portion of German web hosting provider Hetzner's address space. [10] A hosting-provider account identified as AlbaHost said that 5 of its 34 checked Virtualizor hypervisors sustained root-level compromise due to malicious commands inserted into legitimate files. [11] Virtualizor released Patch 9 with a Security Analyzer on September 1, 2026, but stated that cryptographic package signing remained future work. [12]
Proof12 sources · 3 publishers
What this stands on
  1. Hackers carried out a supply chain attack that installed malware on networks by hijacking a chunk of Internet space used for updates of cloud management software. · arstechnica.com
  2. The attackers performed a BGP hijacking to obtain control over IP addresses assigned to Softaculous, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. · arstechnica.com
  3. The attackers used the hijacked IP addresses to push malware masquerading as updates to unsuspecting users. · arstechnica.com
  4. Softaculous confirmed that a malicious Virtualizor update package was delivered to a small number of installations that checked for updates while their traffic was being diverted by a BGP hijack. · SecurityWeek
  5. The attackers delivered a malicious Virtualizor package to some installations by exploiting the diverted update traffic, and the update client lacked cryptographic package verification. · The Hacker News
  6. Virtualizor reported that hackers used a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack to divert Softaculous traffic to an attacker-operated server during the incident window from August 28 at 20:57 UTC to August 30 at 06:10 UTC. · The Hacker News
  7. Softaculous used the hijacked IP addresses to issue updates and host a client and billing site. · arstechnica.com
  8. Softaculous encourages all Virtualizor operators to check for potential compromises, reset client-area passwords, review account activity, and regenerate API keys. · SecurityWeek
  9. Softaculous notes that their product update clients did not yet cryptographically verify update packages, which allowed a modified package to be installed without rejection. · SecurityWeek
  10. The BGP hijack started at approximately 20:57 UTC on August 28, 2026, when AS62390 (NexonHost) began announcing a portion of German web hosting provider Hetzner's address space. · SecurityWeek
  11. A hosting-provider account identified as AlbaHost said that 5 of its 34 checked Virtualizor hypervisors sustained root-level compromise due to malicious commands inserted into legitimate files. · The Hacker News
  12. Virtualizor released Patch 9 with a Security Analyzer on September 1, 2026, but stated that cryptographic package signing remained future work. · The Hacker News
We do not know which country they publish from. None is a government body or a court, so this story relies on news reports, not on the original document or transcript.
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