Hackers carried out a supply chain attack that installed malware on networks by hijacking a chunk of Internet space used for updates of cloud management software. [1]
The attackers performed a BGP hijacking to obtain control over IP addresses assigned to Softaculous, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. [2] The attackers used the hijacked IP addresses to push malware masquerading as updates to unsuspecting users. [3][7] Softaculous confirmed that a malicious Virtualizor update package was delivered to a small number of installations that checked for updates while their traffic was being diverted by a BGP hijack. [4][5]
Virtualizor reported that hackers used a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack to divert Softaculous traffic to an attacker-operated server during the incident window from August 28 at 20:57 UTC to August 30 at 06:10 UTC. [6] Softaculous encourages all Virtualizor operators to check for potential compromises, reset client-area passwords, review account activity, and regenerate API keys. [8] Softaculous notes that their product update clients did not yet cryptographically verify update packages, which allowed a modified package to be installed without rejection. [9]
The BGP hijack started at approximately 20:57 UTC on August 28, 2026, when AS62390 (NexonHost) began announcing a portion of German web hosting provider Hetzner's address space. [10] A hosting-provider account identified as AlbaHost said that 5 of its 34 checked Virtualizor hypervisors sustained root-level compromise due to malicious commands inserted into legitimate files. [11] Virtualizor released Patch 9 with a Security Analyzer on September 1, 2026, but stated that cryptographic package signing remained future work. [12]Hackers llevaron a cabo un ataque a la cadena de suministro que instaló malware en redes al secuestrar un fragmento del espacio de Internet utilizado para actualizaciones de software de gestión en la nube. [1]
Los atacantes realizaron un secuestro BGP para obtener control sobre direcciones IP asignadas a Softaculous, una empresa con sede en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. [2] Los atacantes usaron las direcciones IP secuestradas para distribuir malware que se hacía pasar por actualizaciones a usuarios desprevenidos. [3][7] Softaculous confirmó que un paquete de actualización malicioso de Virtualizor fue entregado a un pequeño número de instalaciones que verificaban actualizaciones mientras su tráfico era desviado por un secuestro BGP. [4][5]
Virtualizor informó que los hackers utilizaron un secuestro del Protocolo de Puerta de Enlace Fronteriza (BGP) para desviar el tráfico de Softaculous hacia un servidor operado por los atacantes durante la ventana de incidente desde el 28 de agosto a las 20:57 UTC hasta el 30 de agosto a las 06:10 UTC. [6] Softaculous insta a todos los operadores de Virtualizor a verificar posibles compromisos, restablecer contraseñas del área de clientes, revisar la actividad de las cuentas y regenerar las claves API. [8] Softaculous señala que sus clientes de actualización de productos aún no verificaban criptográficamente los paquetes de actualización, lo que permitió que se instalara un paquete modificado sin rechazo. [9]
El secuestro BGP comenzó aproximadamente a las 20:57 UTC del 28 de agosto de 2026, cuando AS62390 (NexonHost) comenzó a anunciar una porción del espacio de direcciones del proveedor de alojamiento web alemán Hetzner. [10] Una cuenta de proveedor de alojamiento identificada como AlbaHost indicó que 5 de sus 34 hipervisores Virtualizor verificados sufrieron un compromiso a nivel de raíz debido a comandos maliciosos insertados en archivos legítimos. [11] Virtualizor lanzó el Parche 9 con un Analizador de Seguridad el 1 de septiembre de 2026, pero declaró que la firma criptográfica de paquetes seguía siendo trabajo futuro. [12]
Proof12 sources · 3 publishers
What this stands on
Hackers carried out a supply chain attack that installed malware on networks by hijacking a chunk of Internet space used for updates of cloud management software. · arstechnica.com
The attackers performed a BGP hijacking to obtain control over IP addresses assigned to Softaculous, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. · arstechnica.com
The attackers used the hijacked IP addresses to push malware masquerading as updates to unsuspecting users. · arstechnica.com
Softaculous confirmed that a malicious Virtualizor update package was delivered to a small number of installations that checked for updates while their traffic was being diverted by a BGP hijack. · SecurityWeek
The attackers delivered a malicious Virtualizor package to some installations by exploiting the diverted update traffic, and the update client lacked cryptographic package verification. · The Hacker News
Virtualizor reported that hackers used a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack to divert Softaculous traffic to an attacker-operated server during the incident window from August 28 at 20:57 UTC to August 30 at 06:10 UTC. · The Hacker News
Softaculous used the hijacked IP addresses to issue updates and host a client and billing site. · arstechnica.com
Softaculous encourages all Virtualizor operators to check for potential compromises, reset client-area passwords, review account activity, and regenerate API keys. · SecurityWeek
Softaculous notes that their product update clients did not yet cryptographically verify update packages, which allowed a modified package to be installed without rejection. · SecurityWeek
The BGP hijack started at approximately 20:57 UTC on August 28, 2026, when AS62390 (NexonHost) began announcing a portion of German web hosting provider Hetzner's address space. · SecurityWeek
A hosting-provider account identified as AlbaHost said that 5 of its 34 checked Virtualizor hypervisors sustained root-level compromise due to malicious commands inserted into legitimate files. · The Hacker News
Virtualizor released Patch 9 with a Security Analyzer on September 1, 2026, but stated that cryptographic package signing remained future work. · The Hacker News
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